The Senate approved the bill on anti-Semitism, which is the beginning of a national strategy against this type of racism. For this purpose, various interventions are planned, for example in the area of ​​online hate speech, or in schools, in which training and educational activities on the knowledge of anti-Semitism and the diaspora will be promoted. As for universities, they will have to adopt systems for preventing, monitoring and combating acts of anti-Semitism.

The proposal has caused a lot of discussion, in fact the text has been amended many times in the dialogue between the majority and the opposition, polished in the most problematic parts relating to the manifestation of dissent. In fact, on this point a part of the opposition has highlighted a potential danger to freedom of expression, also expressed by other important entities, such as Amnesty International. Despite the changes, however, some doubts remain.

The definition of antisemitism presents problems

The issue arises from the fact that the definition of anti-Semitism adopted in the law is that of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), the wording of which is a bit ambiguous in some places. The risk is that even legitimate criticism of the policy of the State of Israel will be accused of anti-Semitism. In fact, the definition also includes concrete examples, mostly correct, but there are some that cause concern.

For example, one way of expressing anti-Semitism would be to “deny Jews the right to self-determination, for example by claiming that the existence of the State of Israel is an expression of racism.” This is very similar to an opinion crime: will the citizen be free or not to claim that a state is racist? We say this about many countries, it is curious that Israel should be an exception.

It seems that opinions are punished, rather than hatred

Similar is the point that says it is anti-Semitism “to make comparisons between contemporary Israeli politics and that of the Nazis.” How is it possible that making comparisons becomes a prosecutable act? It is the expression of an opinion, which has nothing to do with anti-Semitism, if it is not formulated by attributing an intrinsic Nazi attitude to Jews as an ethnic group, but by mentioning it only in reference to the policies of a State.

The same goes for “accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel or to alleged priorities of Jews in the world than to the interests of their nation.” But why shouldn’t I be free to say that in my opinion the Jews are faithful to Israel? Maybe it’s a false and even stupid statement, but it’s not a racial slur. On the state of Niger or Uganda I could very well say what I want and no one would intervene.

Why a specific law for a certain form of racism?

In addition to the serious problematic nature of the definition, in fact, it is precisely the initial proposal that generates perplexity. Is racism against Jews different from racism against other peoples? Or rather: it is different historically and is obviously specifically referred to this people, but why should it be regulated in a special way compared to other forms? Among other things, this is particularly funny if we consider that the party proposing the law has rather loose ends when racism concerns other ethnic groups.

On the FdI website we read that this specific attention to anti-Semitism is due to the “historical, cultural and moral specificity that the phenomenon of anti-Semitism has for Italy. This choice does not imply any hierarchy between discriminations, but intends to address with targeted tools a problem which, due to its roots and its current nature, requires dedicated regulatory attention.”

Does the historical moment have anything to do with it?

Of course it implies a hierarchy, otherwise the law would not be appropriate for anti-Semitism. It is known to everyone that one must tread much more carefully on this topic than on any other form of racial discrimination: opposing this law is automatically interpreted, in turn, as anti-Semitism. And so in general the criticism of anything connected to Judaism is. How is it possible that this proposal is considered fair, indeed normal? And why does it come after the many protests against the Palestinian genocide, which were also systematically dismissed as anti-Semitic?

Among other things, the effectiveness of such a provision is also up for debate; Gad Lerner himself raised the hypothesis of a resurgence of anti-Semitism itself precisely because of these special restrictions. But the impression one gets is that, as always, we are interested in grandiose gestures rather than concrete results.