Following the attack of United States And Israel against Iran, Tehran’s response came almost immediately, including missiles against American bases in the Middle East and the almost total closure of the Strait of Hormuzthe marine corridor through which approximately 20% of the world’s oil passes. The International Energy Agency called what followed the largest oil supply disruption in global market history — yet markets, at least so far, are holding up better than the numbers would suggest. Understanding why is the most useful way to truly gauge the severity of this crisis. Which is the seventh in seventy years: the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Six Day War of 1967, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1978-79, the Gulf War of 1990-91, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. And now the conflict in Iran. Every time, oil is at the center.
Oil and gas prices after the war in Iran: updated data from the EIA
In the days following the attack, the Brent oil price it rose from around 70 dollars a barrel to almost 120 dollars, and then fell back to around 92-100 dollars. An increase of about 50% compared to the beginning of 2026, according to EIA data updated March 9.
The European gas he reacted even more abruptly. The TTF, the European reference price, exceeded 60 euros per megawatt hour with an increase of around 40-50%, also driven by the suspension of exports from the main LNG plant in Qatar. At the pump, petrol and diesel in Europe increased by 22% and 32% respectively in two weeks.
Because the IEA speaks of the most serious crisis in history
In his Oil Market Report March 2026the International Energy Agency has not used half measures: the war in the Middle East is creating the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. Flows through the Strait of Hormuz have plummeted from about 20 million barrels a day to a trickle. Gulf countries have cut production by at least 10 million barrels a day. Global supply is expected to decline by 8 million barrels per day in March alone.
The comparison term helps to understand the scale of the problem. THE’Arab embargo of 1973considered the benchmark of oil shocks until now, had removed around 5 million barrels per day from the market. The current crisis is double that shock, and it materialized in days, not months. Diesel, jet fuel and LPG are the most affected products, because alternatives to offset those volumes are limited and time-consuming.
The problem is not only the amount of oil taken from the market, but also where the production capacity is located unused which could compensate for it. The so-called global spare capacity is estimated at 2.5% of world production, below the 3% threshold considered the minimum safety level. And most of that capacity is concentrated in the Gulf countries – Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Kuwait – which must pass through Hormuz to export it. As long as the Strait is blocked, that reserve is effectively inaccessible.
Because the markets are holding up better than the seventies
With numbers of this type, it is natural to ask why the global economic impact is so far less devastating than what happened in the crises of the 1970s, when prices tripled and rationing at the pump began in many countries. Three main reasons explain the difference.
There first is the institutional response. On March 11, the 32 member countries of the IEA agreed on the release of 400 million barrels from strategic reserves: the largest coordinated operation in the history of the agency, created in the aftermath of the 1973 crisis to manage situations of exactly this type. In the seventies that instrument did not exist, and governments found themselves at a loss chase events without safety nets. Today, global strategic reserves amount to about 1.2 billion barrels, enough to cover several months of partial disruption. The markets know this, and this reduces the panic component that in the past amplified real shocks.
There second reason is the diversification of the offer. Over the last twenty years the United States has transformed the market with the production of shale oil: According to IEA data, American growth between 2008 and 2025 covered about 70% of the expansion in global supply. That production is not dependent on Hormuz, is not exposed to Gulf tensions and, with prices at current levels, has every incentive to accelerate. The timing is not immediate – months, not days – but the prospect exists and the markets are discounting it.
The tThe third is energy efficiency. According to an analysis by CSIS (Center for strategic and international studies), the energy intensity of global GDP is dropped by approximately 36% in the 25 years to 2024: the world economy consumes less oil to produce the same wealth as in the seventies. This does not eliminate dependence on hydrocarbons, but attenuates it, making each shock a little less transmissible to the real economy than in the past.
War in Iran and bills in Italy: how much it will cost us in 2026
Italy does not import oil directly from Iran, but this does not protect it. The gas price in Europe is formed in Amsterdamon the TTF market, and a shock that affects a fifth of global supply is transmitted to all European countries regardless of where they physically purchase the gas. The same mechanism had already emerged in 2022 with Russian gas.
According to the CGIA of Mestrethe war in Iran risks costing Italian companies almost 10 billion euros more in 2026: 7.2 billion on electricity costs and 2.6 billion on gas, for a overall increase of 13.5% compared to 2025. According to an analysis by Oxford Economics cited by the Financial Times, Italy is the most exposed among the advanced economies: inflation could exceed 3% by the end of the year, more than a percentage point higher than pre-conflict forecasts.
Renewables and the energy crisis: why they did not cushion the shock
The crisis has highlighted a structural limit which the data already showed but which the shocks make plastically visible. The renewable sources they couldn’t soften the blow because they mainly cover electricity generationwhich represents approximately one fifth of total energy consumption. The other four-fifths still depend on oil and gas. The growth of renewables in recent years has been additive, not substitutive: it has been added to fossil fuels without displacing them in the overall energy balance.
This doesn’t mean the transition is useless. It means that, at present, one shock on hydrocarbon supply continues to transmit its effects on the entire economy with the same speed and intensity as previous crises. Seven in seventy years, with an almost ten-year cadence, suggests that the next one is likely. The question is whether by then the energy system will have changed enough to absorb it differently.
