The US Transportation Safety Agency (National Transportation Safety BoardNTSB) has released its final report on the implosion of the bathyscaphe Titanconfirming theinadequacy of the design process conducted by OceanGate and the existence of serious structural damage already sincedive number 80i.e. 8 dives preceding the one that cost the lives of all 5 passengers on board (number 88, in fact).
The NTSB confirms what was already anticipated last August in the report United States Coast Guardwhich had highlighted the loss of structural integrity of the Titan (made of carbon fiber) as the main cause of the immediate implosion of the bathyscaphe (often incorrectly defined as a submarine or submarine).
Given that the regulations in force for small passenger boats have proven insufficient to guarantee the highest safety standards, the Safety Board finally recommended that the US Coast Guard establish a group of experts to check the status of the submarines currently in use.
What the NTSB report reveals about Titan’s implosion
In its final report on the implosion of the Titan, which occurred on June 18, 2023, the National Transportation Safety Board focused on several elements. In particular, it was highlighted that:
- The Titan pressure tank, made of carbon fiber, it suffered damage following thedive number 80in the form of one or more delaminations (i.e. the separation of the layers within the carbon fiber, with the consequent loss of strength and integrity of the structure) which weakened the pressure tank.
- Following theimmersion 82the Titan has recorded damage additions of unknown origin, which led to a greater weakening of the tank, causing a local failure which caused the implosion of the Titan during theimmersion 88.
- The process of Titan design hosted by OceanGate it was inadequate and led to the construction of a carbon fiber composite pressure vessel that had multiple anomalies and did not meet the necessary requirements of resistence And duration.
- Since OceanGate did not adequately test the Titan, the company was unaware of the actual strength and durability of the pressure tankwhich was probably much lower than their goal, nor how some operational changes could affect the integrity of the latter. Among other things, the real-time monitoring of the pressure tank had been conducted incorrectly: as a result, the company was unaware that the Titan was damaged already from dive 80.
The causes of the Titan accident: the conclusions of the US Agency
There National Transportation Safety Board therefore concluded that the cause of the failure of the hull and the implosion of the Titan submarine is to be attributed primarily to theinadequacy of the design process by the OceanGate company, which failed to establish theeffective resistance and durability of the Titan’s pressure tank and ended up using a carbon fiber composite tank that suffered delamination damage.
The situation then went further aggravated by other damage of unknown origin, which caused deterioration of the internal structure, leading to local failure of the pressure vessel. At the same time, OceanGate’s flawed analysis of the real-time monitoring data led the company to continue operating the bathyscaphe despite a damaged pressure tank.
According to the Agency, voluntary guidelines and the US regulations for the small passenger boats, which turned out to be insufficient to ensure that OceanGate fully complied with industry standards for maximum security. The Safety Board therefore recommended that the US Coast Guard establish a group of experts to verify the status of currently operating submarines and implement updated regulations.
