There is a moment, in every public debate, when we need to stop telling ourselves fairy tales and look at the numbers for what they are. We have been at that point on the Superbonus for a while, but many – even in the printed press – continue to pretend nothing happened. The latest report on Enea’s energy efficiency was read – and reported by Fatto Quotidiano and Il Sole 24 Ore – as yet another confirmation of the 110% effectiveness: millions of equivalent tonnes of oil saved, efficiency objectives almost achieved, bills reduced.

It’s a shame that, if we go beyond the titles, the picture changes radically. And the “big grab” for the Superbonus is revealed for what it is: a gigantic operation of (bad) public spending passed off as climate and social policy, from which few have benefited. But on the other hand it got too many into trouble, including businesses and owners who had believed in restructuring at the expense of the state.

The “beautiful” numbers that politicians like

Let’s start with what is being held up as the main evidence. According to Enea, in 2024 Italy would have saved 2.9 million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in the residential sector alone, of which 1.3 Mtoe attributed to the Superbonus and the rest to other building incentives. It is more than half of the overall efficiency savings, equal to 4.5 Mtoe, which in turn represent approximately 90% of the 2024 target set in the energy plans.

On paper, it sounds great: 110% and building bonuses as a big driver of the green transition. It’s the type of story that politicians love to tell: we spent a lot, yes, but for the good of the planet and families. The problem is that these numbers hold up as long as they remain closed within the reassuring perimeter of press releases. The moment we cross-reference them with the final bill presented to the state and taxpayers, the narrative crumbles.

The trick of the method: this is how your savings swell

Enea does its job: monitors, collects data, applies methodologies. But those very methodologies need to be explained. The energy savings are in fact calculated parametrically, i.e. on the basis of standard values ​​associated with the various interventions (coats, fixtures, boilers, heat pumps).

What is missing is the most banal and most important element: how consumption has really changed after the works. This alone would be enough to suggest caution. But there’s more. No one has seriously measured what share of interventions concern second homes, holiday homes, properties used a few weeks a year. Proportionally, energy savings can even double, but if the apartment remains empty eleven months out of twelve, the real effect on consumption and CO₂ is microscopic.

The income statement: 170 billion for savings worth 18

So far, the benefits. Now let’s move on to costs. For the energy efficiency part alone, Enea himself indicates a cost of around 129 billion euros. The data updated to 31 October 2025 shows that only the Superbonus generated:

• over 122 billion in works eligible for deduction;
• almost 128 billion in deductions accrued for completed works.

If we then add the approximately 55 billion of the facade bonus, the overall mountain of tax deductions exceeds 170 billion euros. At this point another act enters the scene, ruining the party. Based on the same Enea estimates, Superbonus and facade bonuses produce 1.4 Mtoe of energy savings per year. Even assuming that they are all barrels of oil and valuing them at 70 euros each, we are talking about around 700 million euros of savings per year.

Let’s do the complete calculation: useful life of the interventions is approximately 40 years. However, it is necessary to apply a discount rate of 3%, i.e. to evaluate how much future savings are “worth today” and therefore we conventionally choose to apply the implicit interest rate, i.e. the order of magnitude of long-term real rates. The result? Around 18 billion euros.

Translated: the Superbonus and the Facade Bonus generate, when fully operational, energy savings that can be estimated at around 700 million euros per year. Even assuming that this flow lasts for 40 years, if we bring it back to today’s values ​​with a rate of 3% – the standard method with which public investments are evaluated – we discover that those future savings are worth around 18 billion. Faced with public spending of almost 170 billion, this means that every euro of savings purchased by the Superbonus has been paid almost ten times over.

Savings paid 10 times

You might argue: okay, it was expensive, but at least we did something for the climate. Things aren’t any better here either. The implicit cost per ton of CO₂ avoided with the Superbonus varies from a few hundred to over a thousand euros per ton, while the average price of CO₂ in the European system (ETS) is around 70–80 euros. It means that we have chosen one of the most expensive tools ever to reduce emissions.

And it’s not over. If we take the European objectives seriously – 55% less emissions by 2030, climate neutrality by 2050 – it is completely unrealistic to think that the redevelopment interventions would not have arrived anyway, perhaps in a more targeted form and in a shorter time frame.

The real “extra” of the Superbonus, then, is the advance payment: we have concentrated a series of works in three-four years which, in a “normal” transition path, would have been spread over one or two decades. But the environmental benefit should be calculated only on this advance, not on the entire useful life of the works. After 2030-2050, when the energy system will have to be largely decarbonised, the efficiency of individual homes weighs much less in terms of CO₂ avoided. The debt, however, remains.

Zero equity

Then there is an aspect that makes the Superbonus difficult to defend by anyone who cares about the word “fairness”. According to the most conservative reconstructions, only 4 percent of owners managed to access 110%. The benefit on the bill – and the increase in the value of the properties – therefore concerns a minority. Spending, however, is entirely public. Paid for by everyone: owners who were unable or unable to get into the mechanism, tenants, young people who don’t have a home and perhaps won’t have one for years.

The Enea data show a strong territorial concentration of interventions in the richest regions, where structured condominiums and administrative capacity to follow complex practices abound. Once again: the wealthy North took a bigger slice of the pie, while the cost was shared nationally. If there is one thing that this story demonstrates crystal clear, it is precisely this: the Superbonus has socialized the costs and privatized the benefits. Other than “social policy”.