At the beginning of the legislature it seemed like a possible objective: to occupy the center of the political scene, exploit little by little the divisions and disorientations of the jagged opposition front, found a new conservative pole which, by consolidating itself, would build hegemony over the Italian political system, crushing allies and eating up electoral space even from opponents, starting with the mythological moderate vote: small, we know, but rich, influential and relevant, especially in an era of low electoral turnout. Even in these parts, we imagined a Meloni moving away from the barricade and fading the flame, losing something on the right and voraciously eating pieces of the electorate and political representation.

It is not yet certain that all this will not happen, but the script that wanted Meloni to approach the last year of the legislature with the wind in her sails and the path traced towards triumph has remained in the drawer; and not due to the merits of his adversaries but, mainly, due to his own choices, problems with allies, dead-end roads taken in our country and in the world. The breakthrough has not arrived: his party, Brothers of Italy, sails unchallenged in the polls at around 30%, and it does not seem realistic that other parties can undermine the relative primacy.

The prime minister cannot remain calm

And yet, the growth of the party founded by the prime minister, up to now, seems to have occurred at the expense of its allies, and the sum of the centre-right parties confirms a relative majority which, without sensational divisions in the opposing camp, cannot leave it calm as the end of the legislature approaches and, with it, the next political elections. Let’s be clear: his is in any case going to be the first government in republican history to remain in office for the entire legislature, and it’s not a detail. It hasn’t broken through, it’s true, but it hasn’t lost consensus either, on the contrary: it seems to have consolidated its perimeter, and this too is new, and this isn’t even a detail. But the next legislature, which will begin with the political elections in 2027, would be the full consecration for Meloni, should she be the first politician in Italian history to return to Palazzo Chigi on the wings of consensus for the second consecutive time. A legislature that will elect Sergio Mattarella’s successor, after fourteen years of Presidency of the Republic. We will be back. But before this future that begins “after Mattarella” and which Meloni thinks about every day, several times a day, it is worth looking at the present and the recent past, to try to understand the trajectory of Italian politics in the near future.

Trump and justice reform, the circles in the fire of consensus

The pattern, in international politics, was and remains clear: Atlantic loyalty and the preferential relationship with Trump are the emotion of international politics that Giorgia Meloni does not want and cannot interrupt. Europe is a duty that – in excellent company on the Old Continent – the Italian right aims to lighten, strengthening its soul as a place for negotiating national interests rather than the cuisine in which they amalgamate to become common interests. It’s not the first time, and never like this time have so many people thought that it’s the right path. Of course, in our case, reasonably not by chance, the design of Palazzo Chigi closely resembles the desire of the occupant of the White House. Even Trump’s predecessors wanted a rather lukewarm good for the European Union, but no one had ever gone so far as to declare and pursue isolationism and trade war in the direct and explicit form chosen by the current president of the United States. Issues would have remained far from the perception of the Italian citizen if Trump had not gone so far as to threaten Greenland, Iran, to overthrow the government of Venezuela, to give the idea that every balance is precarious if and only if it disturbs US interests, to wage a volatile trade war of which the borders continue to change, if he had not endorsed the harsh repression of the protests in Minneapolis only to then backtrack belatedly. Even in suburban bars, listening to conversations between patrons who do not have the air or tones of Elly Schlein fans, the style of the (White) House seems to have arrived as a source of concern and, perhaps, hearing one’s Prime Minister so timid in criticizing has surprised and disturbed even those who experience politics with detachment, and think of Meloni without any negative prejudice. Indeed, perhaps he voted for it and would vote for it again.

The margin of yes is narrow

Precisely at such a moment, the process of justice reform and the referendum envisaged by the Constitution which will be held on 22 and 23 March comes to maturity. Until a few months ago, pollsters and observers seemed certain: the margin in favor of yes, that is, popular confirmation of the reform signed by Nordio on the separation of careers and the reform of the CSM, was large, more or less in any condition of turnout. Then, at a certain point, the music changed and the game was on. As always, when a match that seemed closed reopens, following emotional waves that are unfathomable and difficult to reconstruct, those who were underdogs become favourites. Even though I personally do not believe that the outcome of the match will be decisive for the future of Italian politics and for the overall balance, it remains undeniable that the stakes are high, for everyone, and even more so for the morale of the troops of the Italian right. It is no coincidence, while almost everyone is thinking about much else, in parliament the centre-right is accelerating on a new electoral law, which provides for a majority bonus for the winning coalition that takes over 40% of the votes, and a run-off between the coalitions in the event (unlikely, with the perimeter unchanged) that none of the coalitions in the field reaches the same threshold. With the law currently in force, everyone knows it, as long as Campo Largo arrives more or less united at the vote and it would be impossible for Meloni to have a majority in the Senate, and therefore to govern.

The electoral law

This will therefore be the real post-Referendum task force, whatever happens, with more negotiating strength with the allies in the event of defeat, keeping an eye on the centre, where Carlo Calenda continues to say he is an alternative to the two populisms, perhaps waiting for arguments that convince him to consider one of the two worse than the other, and one on the right where General Vannacci’s National Future could create several problems, even taking 2% or a little more. With both being so different, the need for negotiation will still be likely. The other two, Salvini and Tajani, seem unconvinced of providing the leader of the coalition with an edge to strengthen its grip on the center-right and on the country, making their negotiating power as allies inferior. In the event of defeat in the March referendum, paradoxically, it could become easier to convince everyone that an electoral law is better which – at least theoretically – will make it easier to win again, without being too picky. Also because the next parliament, in 2029, will be called upon to elect Sergio Mattarella’s successor.