Greenland returns cyclically to the public debate as if it were a “mysterious” geopolitical object, to be conquered or defended quickly. But before the comments and the fans, we need the fundamentals. The island – the largest in the world – is geographically part of North America. In ancient times, humans reached it both from the west (walking on the ice: the Amerindian Inuit) and from the east (by sea: the Norse populations, the Scandinavian “Vikings”). Today the largely prevalent ethnic group is Inuit, culturally similar to the populations of Northern Canada. Yet the only governmental and administrative form that has stabilized on the island is that of the Kingdom of Denmark.

An American island associated with the EU

Over time, based on international and democratic obligations, Copenhagen has granted increasing autonomy to the native population, who in the meantime has integrated – also socially – into the Scandinavian model of life. Full independence is the final prospect of all political parties representing the resident population, but the timing is indefinite for a very concrete reason: the population is too small to guarantee sufficient economic autonomy to maintain the current “Scandinavian” standard of living. In fact, Denmark supports the island economically, with the contribution of the European Union as an associated territory dependent on the Danish crown. And one point needs to be clarified: the choice not to hold a referendum on independence yet lies with the resident population, not with the Danish government.

Then there is the European misunderstanding. Greenland does not belong to the EU: it is an “associated territory” and benefits from community funds. The historical reason for the desire not to belong to the Union lies in the European rules on fishing, considered restrictive for a community that sees fishing as its main economic source. (Incidentally: this is also one of the reasons why Norway is not in the EU, despite being very economically integrated.)

In terms of security, Greenland, as a dependency of the Danish crown, is to all intents and purposes within NATO. And its territory – like Canada’s – falls under the responsibility of the North American Defense Command, essentially run by the United States. On the island there are specific installations of the American space and anti-ballistic defense: the famous Thule/Pituffik base and other structures now deactivated by US decision. The Danish military presence, however, is minimal: sensors and patrols, exactly as happens in the great Canadian Arctic.

Chinese aims on rare earths

A typically Scandinavian legacy, endorsed by the local autonomous authorities, is attention to the environment. In the past, in an attempt to increase economic autonomy, mineral exploitation agreements were concluded with Chinese companies interested in the riches of the Greenland subsoil (copper and “rare earths”). Imprudent agreements to say the least. Denmark did not block them because they fell within local administrative jurisdiction. But Chinese mining quickly proved to be too invasive and careless of environmental regulations: it was terminated and the Chinese companies were expelled.

In the historical context, during the Cold War the Soviet Union maintained a powerful “Northern Fleet” in the Soviet Arctic, capable of threatening the Atlantic and the commercial and logistical links between America and Europe. Hence Greenland’s role in the Giuk line (Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom), where NATO aimed to “close” the Atlantic to the Soviet navy.

Putin’s Arctic challenge

After the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Northern Fleet declined; Putin then revitalized it to strengthen control over the warming Arctic, also with strong propaganda emphasis (and the construction of icebreakers). But it never returned to Soviet levels: many ships are Soviet-era and supporting aviation is small. With the war in Ukraine, the Russian posture in the Arctic has effectively collapsed: the threat is limited to strategic submarines (few, and with doubts about the operation of part of the fleet), oceanographic reconnaissance units and hybrid capabilities. There is no amphibious or airborne capability to invade Greenland; and even the possible landing of small groups of reconnaissance-saboteurs would be logistically unsustainable.

Having ruled out a credible Russian military threat and having noted the absence of hostile mining activities in the Greenland area, the Chinese hypothesis remains. But the nearest Chinese base is more than 5,000 nautical miles away. Even imagining the use of Russian bases, China does not currently have the naval projection capability to support a long-distance operation, nor is there any precedent for Chinese naval forces being rebased long-term in Russian bases. We can discuss, at most, a long-term future eventuality: without urgency compared to much more immediate threats elsewhere.

Vaudeville politics

Finally, there is a geopolitical fact that is often ignored: where would the Chinese ships that should threaten Greenland pass through the Arctic routes? There is only one access: the Bering Strait, just 50 nautical miles wide, with islands and listening stations that make undetected transit impossible. And that strait is under US control, supported by bases and infrastructure in Alaska and the Aleutians. In peacetime, trade is not banned: so “owning” Greenland is irrelevant. In wartime, Chinese access to the Arctic would be cut off well before reaching Bering.

Any serious discussion about the safety of the Arctic sea routes and Greenland should start from these facts. Everything else is show politics.