It happened that, taking into account 2025, Italy’s deficit – that is, the difference between what the state spends and how much it collects – stopped at 3.1% of GDP. A whisker above the 3% threshold set by European rules. If that threshold is exceeded, the country must adopt policies to reduce the deficit agreed with the European Commission. So far, one might say, there is nothing dramatic. It is right that public finances are under control. The path, however, is less linear and easy than it may appear at first glance.

A blocked future

It’s not enough to say “we’ll get back below 3%”. That small 0.1% enters directly into the heart of the economic decisions of the coming years and changes the government’s room for manoeuvre. It means having less freedom in making a new deficit even if we are talking about investments. Every intervention – be it a tax cut, an increase in pensions, support for businesses – must take into account the objective of recovery. It is not impossible to make expansionary policies, but it becomes more difficult, more conditioned, more negotiated.

The reduction in possibilities for maneuver impacts how others look at us, in particular the financial markets. Today, it must be said, there is no lack of confidence: the spread remains at contained levels and the rating agencies have recently improved or confirmed their ratings on Italy.

A choice to interpret

If the answer is a path that risks compressing growth and weakening the economy, then confidence could break down. When interests increase, the resources available for everything else inevitably decrease. And everything else is called pensions, healthcare, services, business support. The problem, therefore, is not that 0.1% in itself. The problem is how you react to that number. Because the markets do not judge the past so much, but the direction that a country decides to take.

That small 0.1% is a choice to be interpreted, the point where rules, reality and common sense intersect.

The fact that the overrun concerns 2025, i.e. the past, is not a detail. If we take that 0.1% and transform it into the only criterion to guide the choices of the coming years, we risk making a very serious and dangerous mistake. And if it becomes our only point of reference, we stop seeing the road ahead. Here, the data on the Italian deficit at 3.1% of GDP should be read like this. It’s a rearview mirror. It says something important about the past, but it cannot be the only criterion with which to decide the economic policy of the coming years. Because the world before us is not the same as the one we just walked through. Growth, inflation, energy, wars, international trade, the cost of money and market confidence change all around. Applying a rule by looking only at the past risks being misleading.

What does 3% mean?

Furthermore, we must remember that 3% is often presented as if it were a scientific truth, but there is no economic evidence that establishes that above 3% the deficit is “bad” while below it is “good”. The economy doesn’t work like that. The 3% serves as a reference to avoid each country doing it on its own. But precisely because it is a convention, it must be applied intelligently.

That’s the whole point: 3.1% is in the rearview mirror. Italy is not in a banal situation. On the one hand, public finances have taken a more orderly trajectory compared to the most difficult years. The deficit has fallen, the season of emergency measures has been progressively shelved, and the government can claim to have started a process of stabilisation. On the other hand, the debt remains high and the cost of state financing continues to have a significant impact. This is the Italian double bind. We cannot afford carelessness, but we cannot afford incorrect treatment either.

This is why the decisive question is not: “How much deficit should we reduce?”. The real question is, “How can we get ourselves on the right trajectory without weakening the economy?”

Tools too rigid

The experience of the crisis that began in 2008, and then of the European sovereign debt crisis, should still be alive in the collective memory. In those years Europe faced a profound crisis with tools that were too rigid. The fear of the markets, the increase in spreads, the pressure on public debts led many countries to rapid and severe austerity policies.

The result, in many cases, was a vicious cycle. Spending was cut or taxes were raised to reduce the deficit. But this weakened domestic demand. Businesses sold less, families consumed less, the economy slowed down. With lower growth, tax revenues also fell. And so the relationship between debt, deficit and GDP became more difficult to correct.

If an economy is already fragile, tightening too sharply can cause it to slide even further. Today the European Central Bank is different, the new rules are more flexible than the previous ones. But the underlying risk remains: confusing discipline with rigidity. Discipline is necessary. Rigidity is harmful. The point, however, is also another. If Europe faces common shocks — wars, energy, inflation, global slowdown — it would be logical and desirable to have a common response. The problem is that a true European fiscal policy does not yet exist.

And so a paradox occurs: the problems are European, but the answers often fall on national budgets. Energy is increasing for international geopolitical reasons, but individual states must intervene. European growth slows, but each country must adjust its accounts. Defense becomes a common priority, but the expense weighs on national budgets.

In this context, asking not to strictly apply the rules is not a whim. It’s common sense. It being understood that flexibility does not mean irresponsibility. It means recognizing that the same return trajectory can be constructed in different ways: one intelligent and one dangerous. The choice is not between “spend without limits” and “cut without thinking”. The choice is between a correction compatible with growth and a correction that risks stifling it.

Italy can say: we are returning, but we do not want to do so by compressing growth, investments and social cohesion. It is not a challenge to Europe, but a profoundly pro-European position.