I’ll explain to you the ambiguous (and dangerous) Chinese strategies for peace in Ukraine
How far does China want to project its image as a “responsible power”? Certainly beyond the Great Wall, probably in those latitudes where support for the United States is creaking. For now, the People’s Republic has pocketed the success of the agreement on the relaunch of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the Beijing Declaration signed by fourteen Palestinian factions, including Hamas, which governs the Gaza Strip, and the Fatah party, to establish an interim government of national reconciliation in Gaza after the war. The war in Ukraine is now missing from China’s diplomatic abacus.
China as guarantor of “peace and stability”
All these efforts are channeled into Beijing’s ambition to propose Chinese paths for security and development alongside a reshaping (and devaluation) of the international system centered on US primacy. The trend has been evident for months, as demonstrated by the launch of two twin initiatives called in English Global Development Initiative (Gdi) and Global Security Initiative (Gsi), which are a security response to the infrastructure project of the Belt and Road Initiative, better known in our country as the New Silk Road.
If the Gdi’s action parameter still remains vague, some ideas on the ambition of extending the Chinese sphere of influence come from the Gsi, which defines the points to present the People’s Republic as a force guaranteeing peace and stability, especially in the “global South”, therefore in that part of the world not aligned with the United States. And we now come to understand what these two initiatives have to do with the war in Ukraine.
What Wang Yi Said to Kuleba
Looking through the GSI document, one of the objectives dear to the current Chinese leadership stands out: “Eliminate the roots of the cause of international conflicts” by ensuring respect for the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries”. Which, coincidentally, are the same points that appear in the 12-point document published by Beijing in February 2023 – on the occasion of the first anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine by Russian soldiers – to reach a peace negotiation on Ukraine and a political solution to the conflict. Beijing starts from the assumption that any dispute must be resolved with political means. An assumption reiterated by the head of Chinese diplomacy Wang Yi also to the Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Dmitry Kuleba, during his three-day trip to China, the first since the beginning of the Russian invasion in February 2022. Kiev knows that it is essential to talk to Beijing, in view of a possible return to the White House of Donald Trump who could undermine and reduce military support for Ukraine.
Negotiations in good faith
During the three-hour talks in the southern city of Guangzhou, Ukraine’s top diplomat told the Chinese Foreign Minister that Kiev is open to a process of dialogue with its Russian counterpart, when Moscow “is willing to conduct negotiations in good faith,” which, he said, there is no evidence of so far. “Although the conditions and time are not yet ripe, we support all efforts that contribute to peace and are ready to continue to play a constructive role,” the Chinese Foreign Minister responded. Kuleba said he was convinced that “a just peace in Ukraine is in line with China’s strategic interests, and China’s role as a global force for peace is important,” the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry press release reported. Chinese media also noted that the Sino-Brazilian proposal for resolving the war in Ukraine was discussed, which argues that “an international peace conference should be held at an appropriate time, recognized by both Moscow and Kiev.”
China Can’t Talk About “War”
But as often happens at the end of high-level diplomatic talks involving China, the two countries’ readouts (i.e., the final statements of the meeting) diverge in their points and presentation. While the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry document speaks of the Russian invasion from the third paragraph onwards, in the Chinese one you have to scroll a bit before you get to read the references to the “crisis in Ukraine” (words like “invasion” or “war” are absent from Chinese political discourse, where, however, more neutral terminology is widely used, such as the “Ukraine issue” or the “Ukrainian crisis”) and the support expressed by the Ukrainian official for China’s position on Taiwan. Support that is not mentioned in the Kiev readout. Some would say that these are subtle differences, incomparable in the face of a joint diplomatic effort. But that someone should be reminded that, yes, “words are important”, as is their use within a diplomatic document. The same one that serves to project the (foreign) vision of a country.
But what is behind Beijing’s diplomatic activism? China has declared itself neutral in the war in Ukraine, but its growing “unrestricted” partnership with Russia has led NATO members to classify it as a “decisive enabler” of the Russian invasion for sending dual-use components (those that have both civilian and military uses) useful to support the Russian war and military effort in Ukraine.
China’s Gift to Ukraine War: Xi, Putin Strengthen Military Cooperation
The irritation of the United States
The irritation of many Western countries, especially the United States and its allies, has grown over the continued economic support for Russia: crushed by international sanctions, Moscow has found in Beijing a faithful buyer of crude oil and gas. All sold at convenient prices for China, which is struggling with a difficult economic situation at home. Last year, the volume of trade reached 240 billion dollars, a record. However, Beijing has become more cautious in recent months to protect itself from Western sanctions that could hit it.
Some political analysts interviewed by the Chinese Global Times summed up the meaning of the Ukrainian official’s visit to China in a few words: “If Ukraine continues to rely exclusively on the West led by the United States, it is likely to be abandoned.” And here we return to the Chinese (and Russian) ambition of an international system alternative to that proposed by the West. But this ambition, which is not welcomed by everyone, reduces the image of “responsible power” that China wants to project both inside and outside the Great Wall. At least until the next attempt at diplomatic mediation.