After accurate planning lasted over a year and a half, on 1 June 2025 the secret services of Kiev triggered the operation called “Spider’s Web“(” Capping “) in which numerous drones of the small Mavic type but padded with explosive have Struck objectives located in some large Russian bases located considerable distance from the front of the Russia-Ukraine war. The declared goal of this attack were the strategic assets of the Russian aerospace forcesin particular the strategic bombers. Although to date the confirmed results have been lower than declared immediately by the Kiev authorities, the operation was in any case a sensational success which highlights considerable weaknesses in the modus operandi of Russia’s intelligence agencies.
The “Spider’s Web” operation
The attack of June 1 was preceded by a method infiltration operation favored by a special Ukrainian agent, now sought after by Russian security services. Moscoviti media only reported that he is 37 years old, he used the alias of Artёm Timofeevand who is native to Donetsk and worked at the LLC Group of Chelyabinsk, in the Ural area. From his privileged position he was able to transfer a series of previously modified containers to Russia and able to launch each 36 Mavic -type drones with short -range but padded with explosive. These containers were then directed near Almenno six important Russian aerial bases (Belaya, Olenya, Ivanovo Severn, Dyagilevo-Ryazan, Voskresensk and Ukrainka) known to host the strategic Tupolev Tupolev Tupolev Bombardieri, Tupolev Tupolev Tu-22m3, Tupolev Tu-60 and other aircraft for special missions such as special missions such as The Beriev A-50U of AWACS type.
There surprise was total And, at first, very little were able to make the anti -aircraft and electronic war defenses, which however entered the action late against the subsequent waves of drones, after the former had scored. The attack was in fact too close (according to some reconstructions even 300 meters away from the objectives) and to be too low so that the defenses had a pre-alarm time sufficient to prevent the attack. The Ukrainian drones, apparently equipped with dedicated software scheduled with artificial intelligence to “visually recognize the objectives”, attacked the Russian aircraft parked along the slopes causing their inconvenience and subsequent explosion.
The attacks did not have the same pre -established course everywhere, given that technical problems, malfunctions in the release systems e unexpected inspections by the drivers trucks (unsuspecting Russian citizens taken on contracts) suspicious of the unusual load and circumstances, in some cases have caused self -destruction prematurely of the bombs. However, it is not yet clear how many drones have actually been used for the attack. Ukrainian official sources speak of 117but it is certainly a underestimation. The foundations attached were all six while, always according to official sources, there were 36 drones on each container. Assuming that there was only one container for each base (but most likely there were two) we would already have a conservative estimate of 216.
Immediately after the attack, the Ukrainian government claimed the “Destruction of 41 enemy planes, equal to 34% of the strategic bombing force of Russia“. According to what was published by the authoritative The Military Watchan in-depth analysis of the published videos and satellite images allows the time to confirm the destruction or damage of 12 Russian aircraft: 11 strategic bombers (7 Tu-95ms and 4 TU-22M3) and 1 An-12 tactical transport plane. It is not said that the total cannot grow further, but with the passing of hours and days, this possibility becomes more remote gradually.
Russian strategic forces
Together with the USA and China, Russia is one of the few countries with a imposing arsenal of nuclear weapons Based on a complete and numerous triad (terra-mare-air). Since the dawn of the Cold War, the strength of long-haul strategic bombers (from) represented the flagship of the Soviet air force first and then Russian, then acquitting primarily for dissuasion tasks in the context of the doctrine of the NATO-Patto of Warsaw called Mad (Mutual Assured Destruction).
Centers of nuclear war scenarios, it also retains considerable potential in the context of the conventional war, and for this reason its own strategic bombers They were employed by the Soviets during their war in Afghanistan (1979-1989) but also in the wars of Russia in Chechnya, Georgia, Syria and now in Ukraine. From 22 February 2024 to today, the Russian strategic bombers have played a very important role in the military strategies of the Kremlin because they participated in the regular bombings by means of long-range cruise missiles directed against objectives located well within the Ukrainian territory, in particular the energy grids, essential to guarantee the functioning of the-pass system.
Given their danger, it was normal that the bombers of the Da constituted a priority objective for the Ukrainians, who attempted to put them out of combat on several occasions using both their air defense systems and through long -range attacks with improvised drones directed towards the Russian air bases, without however being able to obtain appreciable results if not to oblige the high Russian command a disperse their bombers strategic on different bases.
Russian intelligence failure
Net of the results obtained on the ground, the “Spider’s Web” operation is configured as a considerable success by the Ukrainian secret services and, in parallel, a colossal failure for the agencies ofRussian intelligence which for years have been for years sunk into a spiral of failures which contributed to heavily undermining its image and credibility both at home and abroad. While in fact the armed forces, in the wake of the failures and the difficulties encountered in the first phase of the Russian-Ukraine war, have long undertaken a vigorous reform policy, rearm, expansion of the staff and revision/reorganization of operational doctrines, imprinting a decisive change of course on tactical-strategic level on the war front, the intelligence Moscow has struggled not a little to keep up, collecting a long list of embarrassing Defeats and humiliations and completely failing in the primary mission to protect the territory of Russia from the infiltration of the Ukrainian secret services who have instead demonstrated a professionalism worthy of their ancestors of the Soviet KGB.
What to expect for the future?
Despite the material damage inflicted on the enemy and the exceptional victory in the field of media propaganda and public relations, the “Spider’s Web” operation did not affect Russian strategic forces a blow from Ko e cannot be considered as the beginning of a trend such as to be able to change the fate of the conflict. Certainly, the losses of strategic bombers that the Russians have suffered should not be treated lightly, but at the same time the strategic balances do not change (the triad of nuclear dissuasion has not been compromised, as was considered at the beginning) and soon Moscow will be able to return to bomb Kiev as previously. Furthermore, the extreme organizational complexity put in place for this operation (lasting over a year and a half) precludes the possibility of a short -term repetition with the result of allowing the Russians to reorganize and return to the attack. So the “Spider’s Web” operation – which will also enter the history books of intelligence, special forces and military science in general – will remain a Important event but not determined in the “sea” of the Russian-Ukraine war.
