The issue of the use of nuclear weapons has returned to the center of attention, evoking an emotional reaction comparable to that of a bull in front of the red flag in the arena. Politicians know this well, both in Moscow and in Kyiv, and make extensive instrumental use of it.

It’s Zelensky’s turn: many media outlets have been alluding to his threat of atomic war for weeks, a narrative that could be instrumental in influencing Western public opinion. In reality, Zelensky has not made similar statements: the Ukrainian government has officially reaffirmed its loyalty to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and there is no concrete evidence to contradict this position.

At the same time, detailed rumors coming from anonymous Ukrainian sources suggest that – if US support from the new Trump government proves to be lower than the previous one and the prospect of NATO membership is postponed indefinitely – the only alternative could be the creation of a nuclear deterrent.

This statement appears particularly plausible, since Zelensky would have declared that the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent – ​​or rather the reacquisition, considering that Ukraine possessed nuclear warheads until 1998, when it gave them up following the Budapest Memorandum under American pressure – would represent the only credible alternative to guarantee the country’s security in the absence of NATO membership.

The strategic and diplomatic context

The problem must be seen in the current Ukrainian strategic-diplomatic situation: a peace treaty, at the moment, is simply impossible. It is impossible due to the respective constitutions of Ukraine and Russia, which prohibit the cession of sovereign territory and which at the same time sanction the overlap of the same territories (the oblasts of Sevastopol, Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhya and Kherson are considered their own by both countries due to the referendums wanted by Putin). It is also impossible because the change of borders imposed by force is a taboo under international law that the global community – including China – cannot accept.

Since, however, international pressure to end the conflict continues to grow, the only way out remains that of an armistice: a cessation of hostilities which does not sanction any legal and recognized change in the legal situation of the disputed oblasts and which postpones solution to the problem indefinitely, possibly with peaceful methods, as happened with the reunification of Germany or with the Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries.

From this perspective, the type of guarantees that would be granted to Ukraine becomes central: to accept a solution, even if only temporary, that leaves part of its territory under enemy occupation, Kyiv would have to be certain that the aggression will not be repeated to complete the Russian occupation of the disputed oblasts (still largely in Ukrainian hands). After all, even the Budapest Memorandum offered guarantees that were completely disregarded by all signatories (USA, UK, France and Russia as well as Ukraine itself), and the UN, due to Russia’s presence as a permanent member of the Security Council, is discredited and out of the picture.

The nuclear option: between technical reality and political strategy

In fact, NATO countries and those in possession of nuclear weapons are those that enjoy the greatest guarantees against foreign invasions. Again in fact, Ukraine is the only country that has ever given up its nuclear deterrent and is also the only country, among those that have possessed nuclear weapons, to have been invaded. This is the perception – justified – on the part of Kyiv.

Of the two guarantees, NATO membership is certainly the preferable: it is politically more acceptable, economically more convenient and objectively safer. However, where this path is not viable, it would be necessary to think of an alternative, and here we are with the hypothesis of Ukrainian nuclear power.

Is this a technically credible hypothesis?

Ukraine has the same post-Soviet know-how as Russia. While it has missed the developments Russia has made over the past twenty years, it has deepened its contacts with the West. Furthermore, it has its own nuclear power plants and a relatively advanced industrial base, certainly superior to that of Pakistan, which has a nuclear deterrent.

While building advanced warheads would take a few years, Ukraine could quickly equip itself with less sophisticated but still powerful nuclear weapons, such as plutonium bombs, based on waste from existing nuclear power plants. The carriers – planes, missiles and drones – also already exist and would require minimal modifications.

Is this a politically credible hypothesis?

Politically, the hypothesis is more complex. It could reduce sympathy for Ukraine in the Western world, where public opinion is generally hostile to nuclear proliferation. However, growing uncertainty about American support, especially with the unknown posed by Trump’s election, may push Kyiv to “do something” to maintain focus.

The strategic goal would be to wield the nuclear threat as leverage to keep the path to NATO membership open, capitalizing on Trump’s desire to avoid being seen as having triggered a nuclear crisis.

Is it a strategically credible hypothesis?

Militarily, the nuclear option presents many critical issues. First, it would invite a Russian “first strike” to prevent weapons development. Furthermore, a nuclear escalation against an adversary with a superior arsenal would be unreasonable, as it would authorize a symmetrical Russian response without any NATO reaction. This would eliminate Western sympathies for Kyiv and make things easier for Putin.

Ultimately, the issue of the Ukrainian nuclear threat appears to be more of an instrument of political pressure than a real military strategy. Zelensky, an expert actor and profound expert on human dynamics, knows what the public expects. The red flag of the nuclear threat therefore appears as an expedient to keep the hope of NATO membership alive, despite all the uncertainties.