The war in the Middle East and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have tripled the price of European gas, which has exceeded €100/MWh. As of October 2026, the EU storage level remains at 75%, far from the 90% target. Italy, however, is among the best prepared countries, with reserves over 90%.
The reference price of natural gas in Europe he passed momentarily 100 euros per megawatt houra value that has not been seen since December 2022in the midst of an energy crisis. Before the outbreak of war in the Middle Eastafter the joint US-Israeli attack on Iran, the same price was around 32 euros: in a few months, therefore, the price has more than tripled.
The causes are mainly linked to blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately one fifth of the global supply of liquefied natural gas passed. In short, the strong instability of the area has caused a drastic reduction in supplies of LNG from the Persian Gulf (with flows reduced by almost 80% compared to the previous year): prices have undergone a strong surge also due to the approach of the winter season, with the demand for heating clearly increasing.
The European Energy Commissioner, Dan Jorgensenwarned that Europe risks a new energy price crisis, reassuring however that no immediate risks to the security of supplies emerge: Italyhowever, has reached levels of gas storage equal to 90.77% (data updated as of October 28).
This means that our country is among the best positioned in the EU in terms of storage: the European average, in fact, stops at around 75%.
Having storage facilities 90% full, however, it does not mean being able to cover 90% of the gas needs during the winter. In fact, storage represents a reserve that is added to imports and internal production: according to the European Commission, it normally covers around 25-30% of the EU’s winter gas consumption. In other words, storages constitute a important reservebut they are not the only source of gas available during the winter: Europe continues to depend on imports.
To understand how safe our supplies are, it is therefore necessary to also analyze which countries the gas we import comes from.
How much natural gas have we stored in Italy and Europe
Starting immediately from Italy, al October 28, 2026 our underground gas storage sites result full al 90.77%. To give an order of magnitude, the total capacity of Italian plants is approximately 203 TWh and, at the moment, they contain some approximately 184.3 TWh. This is a clear level superior at the national historical average (which generally stands at around 134 TWh).
Furthermore, the Ministry of the Environment and Energy Security has confirmed for the contractual year 2026-2027 the volume of strategic storage at 4.62 billion standard cubic meters, approximately 51 TWh. This volume serves to guarantee supplies even in the event of particularly harsh winter or unexpected interruptions.
At a European level, however, the situation is less comforting: al October 21, 2026 The EU storage they turned out equal to 75% of capacity, a level well below the 90% target set by the European Storage Regulation (but achievable between 1 October and 1 December).
Numbers in hand, overall storage amounts to approximately 849 TWh, a lower level than that recorded in the same period of 2025 and the historical European averages.
The differences between individual EU countries are clear: Italy (90.77%) and the France (87.34%) are in a relatively position solidwhile i Netherlands (65.53%) and the Germany (61.65%) are well below the target, as well as historical averages. However, it must be considered that the national filling objectives vary depending on the exemptions and flexibility measures provided for by European legislation.
These four Villages represent approx two thirds of the total storage capacity of the European Union (around 100 billion cubic meters in total): the data from Berlin and Amsterdam, therefore, weigh significantly on the European average.
But because there is this gap? The causes I am essentially behind this “slowed down” filling economic and regulatory. The summer of 2026 was marked by already high gas prices, making it inconvenient for businesses to store gas in the hot months.
To all this was added, as mentioned, the drastic reduction in imports of LNG due to the blockage of Strait of Hormuz. The situation, however, must be managed as soon as possible, considering the imminent drop in temperatures. At the end of March 2026, for example, European storage levels were at 28%, compared to a historical average of 40%.
Where does the gas come from? The ranking
At this point, however, it comes naturally to ask: who we buy from all this natural gas?
Generally speaking, the European Union And extremely dependent on imports: the vast majority of the gas it consumes is imported and in recent years the supplier map has been significantly reduced. Until 2021in fact, the Russia it covered approx 40% of our imports of gas via pipeline. In the 2025three years after the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, this share dropped to 6%, while, also considering liquefied natural gas (LNG), the Russia represented the 12.5% of total imports of EU gas.
In January 2026, the Council of the EU adopted a regulation establishing that the gas imports from Russia (both via pipeline and LNG) will be prohibited by the end of 2027.
And who took Russia’s place?
According to the most recent data from the European agency ACER, relating to summer 2026 (April-September period), the ranking includes:
- There Norway remains the EU’s main supplier of natural gas, covering approximately 30.5% of total importswith 500 TWh;
- The United Stateswith the 28.5% (468 TWh);
- There Russiawhich continues to represent approximately l‘11.4% of European imports (188 TWh), considering both gas transported via pipeline and LNG;
- The North Africa (Algeria and Libya), with approximately 9.9% (163 TWh);
- The United Kingdomwith approximately the 5.8% (95 TWh).
Compared to the period before the war in Ukraine, Russia’s weight has therefore drastically reduced, while the importance of US LNG has increased above all.
A particularly noticeable change insummer 2026 is about Qatar: due to the Middle Eastern crisis and traffic restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz, the European imports of Qatari LNG yes practically zeroed. This has contributed to further increasing the relative weight of the United States in the European LNG market.
According to estimates by the European agency ACER, the Middle Eastern crisis has added between 18 and 33 billion euros to the cost of Europe’s summer gas imports. These additional costs spread along the entire supply chain, from the gas plants that produce electricity, impacting the bills of families and businesses.
This made it the EU even more dependent on American LNGtransported by ship: today, American LNG alone represents approximately 64% of total European LNG imports and 30% of total EU gas imports. Europe has therefore made itself enormously dependent on US supplies, an aspect which in an increasingly uncertain geopolitical context reinforces, on the one hand, the need to diversify sources and on the other makes us even more dependent on the United States.
For Italy, the supply mix he reflects partly these European trendsbut it has some important specificities. Our country is among the main importers of LNG in the European Union and has several regasification terminals. According to ACER data, in the summer of 2026 the utilization rate of these systems fell to 64%, compared to 72% recorded in the same period of 2025.
Furthermore, Italy benefits from its geographical proximity to North Africa: the supplies via pipeline from Algeria represent one of the country’s main sources of supply, a route which fortunately has not been affected by the Strait of Hormuz crisis and which contributes to making our more solid position compared to the countries of central-northern Europe, more dependent on Nordic routes, those originating from Russia or on LNG cargoes by sea.
It must be said, however, that overall gas demand in the EU remains around 20% lower than pre-crisis levels in 2022: families and industries reduced consumptionwhile renewables continue to grow (solar, for example, experienced strong expansion in summer 2026).
This, in part, eases the pressure on supplies: the winter of 2026-2027, however, presents itself as a complex test, with European stocks lower than usualsupplies from the Gulf still uncertain and the need to compete with Asia for every available LNG cargo.
