The longest week for Italian foreign policy sees Giorgia Meloni in the center of the games, in an attempt to provide a compass for the action of the government while increasingly growing the concern of citizens for a possible extending of the conflict or at least for the arrival of consequences not too indirect of the war in the Middle East (one above all, more than probable: the increase in the price of gas and oil, with consequent surge of inflation). Since 2022, Europe has lived the war on its territory, but in the common feeling, never as after the American bombs in Iran the fear of a general war has spread so much.

Trump, born and Europe: Giorgia Meloni’s fragile strategy

The premier has a difficult task. The attack of the USA at the Republic of Ayatollah, the continuation of the Israeli bombings on Tehran, also on sites not purely linked to the nuclear program, the continuation of the operations of Tel Aviv in Gaza with the consequent massacre of Palestinian civilians, the intensification of the Russian offensive on Kiev and, on the internal front, the surveys that highlight how the Italians are increasingly against it, In the oppositions of increasingly stronger voices than those who ask for the stop to the increase in military expenditure up to a not too hidden request to question Italy’s adhesion to the Atlantic alliance, and just to not miss anything, the doubts about the military expenses that echo here and there in their majority, see the Voce Salvini, here are all these are the stakes that the premier must avoid or must take into account.

An operation not without pitfalls. But the delicate points of Giorgia Meloni’s action are essentially five.

5. The relationship with Trump

For some time Meloni has played everything on the Trump card, boasting that he was the first European housekeeper to be received in the White House after the election of the Tycoon, and even making it clear to the role of mediator between Trump and Europe. A card that, however, the bizarre of the US president, its unpredictability, its anti-European posture, the story very penalizing duties for the Italian economy have transformed into a bogus paper. For Meloni it is difficult to follow Trump in its extravagances (or military offensive) and at the same time it is difficult to abandon it.

4. The use of the US bases

The question strictly follows the previous one. For now, the United States have not requested use of using American military bases in Italy, but how to behave if the conflict in Iran does not stop and was essential for the American ally to draw on the conspicuous war potential that is located in Aviano, Sigonella, Ghedi, Camp Darby and go go? For now, Italy has not made its intentions understand, and Meloni certainly hopes that this does not happen. With a public opinion, including center -right, criticism of the American war in Iran would not be an easy choice.

3. The Gaza affair

On Gaza the Premier took on more clear positions, because he understood that in people the position has changed and the government was too weak. The choice to remain alongside Netanyahu has gradually revealed less paying by hand that grew the violence of the attacks on the Palestinians. But there was still nothing that went beyond a formal sentence. No practical consequence. Like the one that the oppositions to suspend military collaboration with Tel Aviv. It is evident that even in this case if the crisis continues the position of the government would be more difficult to defend.

2. NATO expenses

The increase in military expenses in the born area is a request made by the USA to which Italy will have to submit. The premier partially dodged the threat of an immediate obligation and has “contracted” a growth over ten years, up to 3.5 by 2035. He was able to thwart the threat of a binding commitment year by year, which would have created many problems in the immediate. For now basically it does not change a lot. The accounts will be renovated later. As usual, Italian: whoever lives will see.

1. The relationship with the rest of Europe

In a world that is increasingly reworked for large areas, it is clear that the sovereign choice overshadowed by Meloni in the election campaign, and even more practiced by others in the coalition (see Salvini) is showing all its fragility. The choice of allacing in the EU with the less pro-EU members, such as Orban or anti-EU pole, turned out to be a false track. Also in this case, as for Trump, Meloni understood that a back march is needed, but it will not be simple.