It was July 2024 when some parcels sent by air via DHL courier caught fire in logistics centers in England and Germany. A few months earlier, two submarine telecommunications cables crossing the Baltic Sea had been cut by vessels. In the last few hours, hacker attacks have hit hotels in Cortina d’Ampezzo and Italian consulates abroad, on the eve of the opening of the Milan-Cortina Winter Olympic Games. European governments point to Russia as the prime suspect, amid a rise in deliberate acts of sabotage since the start of the war in Ukraine.
A ship was stopped in Finland due to damage to a cable in the Baltic Sea
But now, Moscow’s hostile moves transcend land borders. The new front of the hybrid war between Moscow and the West is moving to an altitude of 36 thousand kilometers. According to what was revealed by an investigation by Financial Timeswhich cites sources from European security services, two Russian spacecraft – called Luch-1 (launched in 2014) and Luch-2 (in orbit from 2023) – would have intercepted the communications of at least a dozen European strategic assets in geostationary orbit, exploiting the vulnerability of outdated systems.
The “stalking” strategy
The strategy adopted by the Kremlin is that of “shadowing” and involves the positioning of Russian units close to the so-called “target satellites”. In this way, Russian satellites place themselves within the narrow signal cone of ground stations, managing to jam or intercept communications, with the aim of stealing critical information.
According to the latest revelations, the two satellites Luch-1 and Luch-2 have carried out close and sustained approaches to several important European geostationary satellites, which provide essential services not only to the European continent and the United Kingdom, but also to much of Africa and the Middle East. From 2023 – the year of its launch – the Russian Luch-2 satellite would have approached 17 European satellites used for commercial, government and, in some cases, military communications purposes.
Obsolete satellites
The operations were possible because of the vulnerability of the European systems, which were launched years ago without advanced on-board computers or adequate encryption capabilities. This makes European systems vulnerable not only to data interception, but also to potential takeover attempts, should command codes be acquired. There are several reasons why many satellite platforms today are vulnerable to forms of espionage or interference. Over the years, the USA has revolutionized the use of satellites, moving from a few expensive and long-lived systems to more numerous, economical and short-lived constellations, which are deorbited at the end of operation to avoid space debris. In Europe, however, the path has been slower, Alessandro Marrone, head of the “Defence, security and space” program at the IAI, explains to uisjournal.com. The satellites managed by the European Commission as part of the EU space program – in particular those for Earth observation and positioning, navigation and timing systems, the European equivalent of GPS – were designed in the 1990s and 2000s for civilian purposes, with little military involvement and without full awareness of future threats in space.
“Satellite networks are the Achilles’ heel of modern societies”
The most serious alarm concerns the possibility of active sabotage of European satellites. “Satellite networks are the Achilles heel of modern societies,” said German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius. The weakness to which the German minister refers concerns the ability of Russian satellites to intercept signals sent from Earth and, in theory, even manipulate their trajectories. If Moscow could replicate ground commands, it could theoretically activate the thrusters of European satellites, throwing them out of alignment and making them unusable for telecommunications. A forced change of direction could put essential services out of order, such as GPS navigation, the management of electricity networks or the transmission of health data, with impactful consequences for civil society. But the alarm also concerns a forcing of the signals, which could lead to an uncontrolled return of the satellites to Earth.
From airports to personal data: this is how hybrid warfare can affect our holidays
This happens because the European approach to space, until a few years ago, was not very strategic and poorly aware of the military dimension, specifies Marrone. “An underestimation which also concerned the threat posed by Russia in space, despite NATO having already recognized space in 2019 as a real operational domain, on a par with terrestrial, naval, air and cyber domains”. A first glimpse came on February 24, 2022, the day of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when a cyberattack hit Viasat’s Ka-Sat satellite network, disrupting internet access for tens of thousands of users in Europe. The goal, according to experts, was not to steal data, but to demonstrate the potential strategic impact of Russian offensives on European space infrastructure and communications networks.
Is it possible to upgrade obsolete systems?
The European Commission has known about these actions “for some time”, but the frequency and aggressiveness of Russian maneuvers in the last three years – in conjunction with the invasion of Ukraine – have pushed military leaders to ask for an urgent upgrade of space defenses. And the answer to this request comes mainly from investments. However, Marrone points out, upgrading or “securing” satellites already in orbit is extremely complex and expensive. It is not possible to easily intervene on these objects, nor imagine agile maneuvers like those depicted in science fiction films. In many cases, the only solution is to launch new satellites. Satellites, however, can be protected from electromagnetic interference, jamming, spoofing and espionage by improving data encryption and adopting anti-jamming technologies, which neutralize signals used to disrupt communications.
The threat can also be military
Russia is intensifying its reconnaissance activity in space: last year it launched two new satellites, Cosmos 2589 and Cosmos 2590, with maneuverability capabilities similar to those of Luch-1 and Luch-2. For the moment, it is possible to breathe a sigh of relief: Russian satellites are not capable of directly destroying European ones.
But the threat is present. A few months ago a Chinese satellite forced another disused satellite to deorbit, clearly marking its ability to intervene. Russia, which destroyed a satellite with a missile in 2021, has similar capabilities. Marrone warns that orbital technology, while useful for repairs and maintenance in “orbit service”, can also be used to damage or manipulate satellites, making them targets of actors such as Russia and China.
What can Europe do to protect itself?
Europe already has a significant role in space thanks to the cooperation between the EU and ESA and the Galileo, Copernicus and secure communications programmes, allowing Brussels to have satellite constellations capable of guaranteeing navigation, intelligence and encrypted communications. But according to the IAI analyst, to guarantee a leap in quality, greater coordination between the EU and member states, civil-military integration and more efficient access to space are needed, where Europe lags behind the United States, which uses cheaper reusable launchers. For over fifteen years, space has been the scene of growing competition between states and, in recent years, between private actors such as Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos. Space has become essential for the Armed Forces: according to Marrone, every country, whether a member of NATO or not, must protect its space capabilities. And respond to a clear message from Moscow: even in space, no one is truly safe.
