Washington threatens, Brussels seeks dialogue. The imperative is to avoid a trade escalation with Donald Trump, but all measures are on the table. At least this is the line that emerges in the Commission and in the main European chancelleries against the backdrop of a tug of war between the two sides of the Atlantic – and NATO allies – over Greenland.
Brussels “promotes dialogue and does not want escalation”, said European Commission spokesman Olof Gill. However, the European Union “has tools at its disposal and is ready to react if the American president were to follow up on trade threats”, he added, referring to the fact that Trump has said he intends to impose 10% tariffs from 1 February against Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Finland, i.e. the countries that have sent military contingents to the island, to then rise to 25% in June, unless an agreement is reached for the “purchase of Greenland”.
Why do we talk about an anti-coercion “bazooka”?
Because the EU has a tool to respond to Trump, but is trying to keep the door of dialogue open to avoid its use. This is the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), and it is an emergency procedure that would allow the European Commission to be given the temporary power to adopt very harsh measures against a country that threatens the European Union economically. The instrument, adopted by Brussels in 2023 and designed to respond to shows of force by countries such as China, provides for the possibility of resorting to emergency measures in response to episodes of “economic coercion” by third countries. With this expression Brussels indicates situations in which a state outside the EU applies, or threatens to apply, trade restrictions against the Union or one of its member states with the aim of influencing their political choices, interfering with their sovereignty. Should Coercion occur, the ICA provides a framework to formally identify it, seek a solution through dialogue and, if necessary, take countermeasures to end the pressure, obtain reparations and strengthen international coordination against such practices.
How the EU reacts to 30% tariffs: the negotiation with Trump and the ICA weapon
Faced with Trump’s increasingly insistent threats and in view of the Davos Forum – which paradoxically was born under the slogan of the “Spirit of Dialogue” – the Europeans are reportedly evaluating countermeasures worth 93 billion euros or the restriction of access of American companies to the internal market. The final decision is expected to come on February 6, six days after Trump’s tariffs go into effect, if any.
What European companies risk
The trade peace reached between Brussels and Washington last summer is now hanging by a thread. The trade agreement, reached on July 27 in Scotland during a visit by Ursula von der Leyen to Trump’s resort, set a 15% tariff on most European goods, including automotive, incorporating previous impositions. The new 10% tariff threatened by Trump against eight countries would be additional to this rate. However, the 50% tariffs on steel and aluminum remain in force, extended over time to many products that contain them, while goods such as aeronautical components and medicines are excluded from the duties. In exchange, the Union has committed to breaking down barriers to US industrial products and to opening up agricultural and fisheries products. And again: purchase energy worth 750 billion dollars by 2028 (LNG, oil, nuclear), US artificial intelligence chips and military equipment.
Italy is the most exposed to trade restrictions
Bilateral trade approaches the threshold of 850 billion dollars, over 500 billion of European exports to the United States, around 60 billion from Italy. Our country is one of the most exposed to new trade restrictions from the USA. In 2024, trade between the United States and Italy reached a total value of approximately $137.6 billion. Italy exports goods worth approximately 68–70 billion dollars a year to the United States, shipping machinery and industrial plants, drugs, vehicles, wine and other alcoholic beverages, as well as medical and optical instruments, to US customs. The USA thus remains one of the main non-EU outlet markets for Italian exports.
On the other hand, US exports to Italy are more limited and are worth between 32 and 44 billion dollars, including both goods and services. Washington primarily sells chemicals, fuels, pharmaceuticals, machinery, as well as precious metals, jewelry and aerospace products. The trade balance is therefore clearly in favor of Italy, with the United States recording a structural deficit against Rome. According to Farnesina data, in the first months of 2025 bilateral trade showed signs of further growth. In particular, Italian exports to the United States increased on average between 8 and 12 percent on an annual basis.
At the same time, there is no shortage of elements of uncertainty. In some months of the second part of 2025, there was a decline in Italian exports to the American market, a sign of more volatile demand and the impact of global economic tensions. An impact that could be stronger this time, despite the good relations between Trump and Prime Minister Meloni.
