Now we have a conventional war also in the Middle East. Not that the need felt, but it was inevitable, like that in Ukraine. Diplomatic hypocrisy has tried for years to hide reality, but when a nation (or its regime) decides aggressively something that another cannot tolerate, the war becomes inevitable. It is a classic case in which diplomacy and public opinion prefer to hide behind unrealistic ideals, refusing to face an inevitable crisis.

Situations vary a lot. For example, China has no urgency to attack Taiwan, while for Israel the urgency was dictated by the Iranian nuclear program, now advanced and ready to equip the missiles already tested against Israeli cities with nuclear newspapers. No Israeli government could have risked, given the declared Iranian intention to destroy Israel.

“At least 10 atomic bombs”: the secret dossier that triggered the war between Israel and Iran

Therefore, it was obvious that Israel would have attacked Iran within the time of its realization of nuclear newspapers. Given the Iranian refusal to interrupt his program and the attestation from the AIEA that this program in addition to proceeding was now far beyond the requirements of a civil employment, the Israeli attack was, as they said, a question of “when” rather than “if”. This, regardless of any ethical or political judgment on Israeli leadership.

A total and asymmetrical conflict

The conflict is ongoing and it is no longer a matter of preventing it but of controlling it. It is not a limited clash, but a total war. Israel will not stop until it has reached the elimination of the Iranian nuclear threat. This operation, called “Rising Lion”, is well planned and not improvised. And Israel also considers the possibility of overturning the Iranian theocratic regime.

It is therefore a high intensity war, with Israeli technological superiority and Iranian geographical-demographic superiority, elements that could make it shorter but extremely dynamic.

Planning and advantages of Israel

Israel was prepared: this attack was clearly planned and organized for some time. As in the case of Russia, the Iranian regime by its nature offers the side of the infiltration of its own economic and demographic fabric: the repressive character of the state, regardless of the capacity of the control bodies, is such as to alienate a significant percentage of the population; Furthermore, those layers that do not share the religious and political priorities of the regime also tend to not identify Israel at all as a natural enemy, and the more hostile to the regime, the more they are available to collaborate with the Israelis, seen precisely as the main opponents of their internal enemy. In fact, in spite of the regime propaganda, the secular component of the Iranian society is far from hostile to Israel, and this leaves large spaces to the best secret services in the world to implant, food and develop an operational intelligence network within the country.

Just as the Gur and SBU Ukrainian have heavily infiltrated the Russian Federation and created operational cells inside, capable of attacking the opposing strategic bases, so the Israeli services and special forces constituted an attack units specialized in Iranian territory, which at the moment chosen attacked the foundations of the Iranian air defense from the ground, already hit months ago by the aviation. The coordination and organizational precision typical of the IDF (the Israeli “defense forces” have led to the almost total destruction of the Iranian air defense: radar, missionistic stations, aerial bases and command centers have been neutralized more or less definitively by drones or sabotage before even the planes arrived, and these completed the work, finishing the opposing defense. The subsequent waves hit the military and scientific personalities, the command centers and the first nuclear installations.

To reach the Iranian airspace, the Israelis do not pass on Jordan and at least for now even on Saudi Arabia: Syria fly over (in addition to being much less hostile, it is now also practically without air defense), the Syrian Kurdistan and the Iraqi one, and finally reach Azerbajan, with whom Israel entertains relatively close and decidedly friendly relationships; Refuel in flight, and from there (i.e. from the north-west) it performs its attacks on a practically defenseless Iran.

Iranian responses and economic implications

Of course, the Iranian impotence is relative: the radar and missile defenses have been swept away, but the “stupid contrast” remains, which is practically unavoidable: machine guns and cannons in enormous numbers that shoot almost blindly, and statistically sooner or later something strike, as understood at the Tornado of Bellini and Cocciolone in Iraq or even an American F-117 in Kosovo. The Iranian aviation has excellent but now obsolete planes such as the Phantoms and Tomcats (now in very low numbers) or on old Chinese planes, and does not represent a real danger, but the Pasdaran have a large number of ballistic missiles, with which it is perfectly possible to reach Israel. In fact, they launched three subsequent waves in response to the first Israeli attack, trying to saturate the Israeli (and American) aerial defenses, and partly also succeeding. For Iranian ballistic missiles, all the more is how repeated for the Russian ones: in the absence of adequate satellite reconnaissance and GPS, they are suitable for hitting only fixed and well -known targets, therefore they have a minimum military value, but they are difficult to stop and in fact they have done damage. The fact is that now that the Israelis have the control of the airspace and fly impunity on all Iran, the launch bases and the deposits of these missiles are in turn vulnerable and will certainly now become a priority for the aviation with the star of David. This is why probably the Iranians will try to launch everything they have, regardless of the availability of useful targets, before it is destroyed on the ground.

It has been highlighted that Israel probably notified the regime with the intention of proceeding in any case to thezzeration of the country’s nuclear capabilities; If this zeroing was somehow immediately passively could stop there, but in the presence of a reaction on Israeli cities, the targeting would extend to oil infrastructures, thus destroying not only the regime’s offensive potential, but also its economy. Now, in the light of the (however predictable) Iranian missile counterattack, the Israeli bombing campaign will be likely to continue for a prolonged time, aiming for total destruction not only of the nuclear infrastructure but also of the military apparatus of the country and – precisely – of the oil one … which could raise the prices of oil, hit our economies and indirectly favor that Russian: all reasons to try to induce Israel to induce Israel to limit yourself to the famous minimum goal.

The Iranian people as a decisive variable

The possibility of changing regime in Iran now depends on the response of the Iranian population, no longer on the western influence, now minimal. The internal attitude remains uncertain and will be decisive to determine the future developments of the conflict.